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Public workforce programs during the Great Recession
This article uses data from the recently compiled Public Workforce System Dataset to assess the response of selected
federal workforce programs to the 2007–2009 recession. The analysis indicates that these programs responded quickly
to the economic downturn, providing timely relief for a large number of unemployed workers. Supplemental funding
secured through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act also enabled federal workforce programs and state
agencies to pay benefits for longer durations and to offer expanded training and reemployment services to program
participants.

This article examines the operations of federally funded public workforce programs during the Great
Recession of 2007–2009. More workers lost their jobs during the recession than in any previous
economic downturn since World War II. As a result, a record number of job seekers participated in
federal workforce programs. Unemployed workers seeking reemployment relied heavily on
unemployment insurance (UI), labor exchange and other reemployment services, and job training. The
U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), in partnership with states and local entities, provides these services
through the UI system, the Wagner–Peyser Act Employment Service, and the Workforce Investment
Act (WIA) programs.
The UI system offers eligible unemployed workers cash assistance for up to 26 weeks in normal
times and longer during economic downturns. The Employment Service provides job matching and job
referral services, as well as other reemployment services, such as help searching for jobs, writing
resumes, and honing interviewing skills. The WIA adult programs provide more intensive job search
assistance and job training to dislocated workers and economically disadvantaged adults. Additional
federally funded programs—including WIA Youth and Job Corps for young people, Trade Adjustment
Assistance programs for workers displaced by foreign competition, and the Senior Community Service
Employment Program for low-income workers age 55 and over—offer employment assistance, but
these programs are not included in the analysis.

Public Workforce System Dataset
DOL has statutory authority to collect data for each of its major public workforce programs. As a
condition of receiving grants from DOL, each state (plus the District of Columbia and certain U.S.
territories) is required to submit reports on a regular basis. Program reports have generally been used by
individual programs, primarily for program management and program performance purposes. Only
recently has DOL attempted to compile these reports in one place for analytical and research purposes.
In 2009, DOL created the Public Workforce System Dataset (PWSD), which assembled data back to
1995 for the federal programs described above.1 For the analysis in this article, the original database
was updated to the third quarter of 2011 for the UI and Employment Service programs and to the first
quarter of 2011 for the WIA adult programs; the update captured the most recent data available at the
time.
Reporting requirements vary by workforce program. Of the programs considered here, the UI
program requires states to submit the greatest number of federal reports on a wide variety of programrelated benefit and tax issues. States submit UI reports to the Employment and Training Administration
(ETA), part of DOL, at different frequencies—weekly, monthly, quarterly, and annually. The data used
here are from the monthly ETA 5159 and ETA 9048 reports, which collect information on UI claimants
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and reemployment services activity. The primary Employment Service report, used for the Labor
Exchange Reporting System, is the ETA 9002 report, which states submit quarterly. State workforce
agencies participating in the WIA programs submit individual participant-level data through the
quarterly (and annual) ETA 9090 and ETA 9091 reports, called Workforce Investment Act
Standardized Report Data. States also submit a number of financial reports to DOL. The PWSD
assembles these data on a quarterly basis. All figures in this article are based on quarterly PWSD data,
while the tables are based on annual data from multiple sources.2

The Great Recession and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
Before the Great Recession, the Employment Service and WIA programs had been funded at fairly
steady levels, with little excess capacity to accommodate a sizable influx of new participants. When the
recession began, these programs had neither the staff nor the funds to adequately handle the enormous
increase in program participants. Financing the UI program is different from funding the Employment
Service and WIA programs. According to federal budgeting rules, the UI program is an entitlement
program, which means that the regular UI program is obligated to pay all eligible workers up to 26
weeks of benefits, with extended benefit programs offering additional weeks of cash assistance,
regardless of program cost.3 However, despite the prospective availability of UI funds at the onset of
the recession, it was not clear whether existing staff capacity was sufficient for the expeditious
processing of additional claims.
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As part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA)—the $787 billion stimulus
package that Congress enacted in February 2009—the public workforce system received almost $12
billion to accommodate the increased number of program participants who had already enrolled in the
programs. Table 1 lists the amounts of ARRA funds received by various programs. In addition to these
funds, starting in June 2008, Congress separately funded enhancements and extensions of the UI
program and continued funding these programs for several years, with some supplemental funding
continuing through December 2012.
Table 1. Major workforce program initiatives of ARRA (2009), and funding levels
ARRA funding category

Funding amount (billion dollars)

UI Administration

0.500

UI Modernization

7.000

Wagner–Peyser Act grants to states

.150

Wagner–Peyser Act reemployment services

.250

WIA Adult

.500
1.250

WIA Dislocated Worker
WIA Dislocated Worker National Reserve

.200

High Growth and Emerging Industry grants

.750

WIA Youth

1.200

Job Corps

.250

YouthBuild

.050

Senior Community Service Employment Program

.120

Source: David H. Bradley and Ann Lordeman, Funding for workforce development in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
(ARRA), CRS report for Congress R40182 (Congressional Research Service, 2009).

Unemployment Insurance
The UI program pays benefits to unemployed workers who have a sufficiently long work history and
who have lost their jobs through no fault of their own. In most states, regular UI benefits are generally
paid for up to 26 weeks. By providing cash assistance to displaced workers during an economic
downturn, the UI program operates as an automatic stabilizer of the U.S. economy. In an economic
downturn, the amount of benefits paid out increases automatically, because the UI program is a
budgetary entitlement not subject to budget appropriations either at the state or federal level. As the
U.S. economy entered the recent recession, unemployment rates—as measured both by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics Current Population Survey (CPS) and by insured unemployment program enumerations
—more than doubled in the period between the cyclical unemployment low in 2007 and the cyclical
unemployment highs in 2009 and 2010.

Page 3

Monthly Labor Review

U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS

State UI agencies responded quickly to the recession, succeeding in determining program eligibility
and making payments to a greatly increased flow of UI claimants. As a result, the number of
unemployed workers receiving first payments under the regular UI program nearly doubled between
2006 and 2009. Because of longer durations of insured unemployment, the total amount of regular UI
benefits paid out increased by 250 percent during this period. (See table 2.)
Table 2. UI first payments, exhaustions, and expenditures, fiscal years 2005–2011
Category

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

CPS civilian

5.20

4.80

4.60

5.30

8.60

9.80

9.20

UI

2.10

2.00

1.90

2.20

4.10

3.70

3.00

First payments

8.00

7.40

7.50

8.80

14.40

11.30

9.70

Regular exhaustions

3.00

2.70

2.60

3.10

6.40

7.00

5.10

31.22

30.15

31.41

38.14

75.34

63.04

48.52

.00

.02

.02

.02

4.12

8.00

11.92

(1)
EUC08

.00

.00

.00

3.55

32.66

72.09

52.66

Federal Additional Compensation

.00

.00

.00

.00

6.48

11.71

1.92

(3)
and UCX

1.38

1.31

1.30

1.36

1.09

1.52

1.58

All UI program payments (billion dollars)

32.61

31.46

32.70

43.05

119.69

156.37

116.80

State tax collections (billion dollars)

35.08

35.94

33.71

32.22

31.14

38.28

49.27

Unemployment rates (percent)

Program activity (millions)

Payments (billion dollars)
Regular benefits
Extended benefits

UCFE

(2)

Notes:

(1)
(2)

EUC08 = Emergency Unemployment Compensation 2008.
UCFE = Unemployment Compensation for Federal Employees.

(3)

UCX = Unemployment Compensation for Ex-servicemembers.
Note: Payments for individual UI programs may not add to totals because of rounding.
Source: UI Outlook, President's Budget FY 2013 (U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Unemployment Insurance, March 2012).

During the recession, media attention was focused on the enormous increase in the number of long-term
unemployed workers, or those defined in the CPS as unemployed for more than 26 weeks. Because
most states extend regular UI benefits for 26 weeks, the CPS definition of long-term unemployment
corresponds largely to those UI recipients who have exhausted their entitlement to regular benefits.
Between 2007 and 2010, the number of UI beneficiaries who exhausted their regular benefits increased
from 2.6 million to 7.0 million.
The regular UI program is considered adequate when the economy is not in a recession and
unemployment rates are at low levels, commensurate with full employment. Starting in the 1950s,
however, Congress found the regular program inadequate in times of high unemployment rates, when
more workers exhaust their basic 26-week entitlement. In responding to recessions in 1958 and 1961,
Congress enacted temporary extended benefit programs to meet the short-term need for additional UI
benefits. In 1970, Congress enacted a permanent Extended Benefits program designed to eliminate the
need for temporary extensions by setting targets that automatically trigger extended benefits when
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unemployment rates exceed prespecified levels. In fact, the permanent Extended Benefits program
became a second-tier program, and Congress enacted additional temporary third-tier programs in
response to recessions in 1971, 1974, 1982, 1991, 2002, and 2008. The temporary recessionary
extensions that began in 1971 resulted in much longer potential durations of benefits, but, until 2009,
the total potential duration of regular UI, Extended Benefits, and temporary emergency extensions was
never greater than 72 weeks and, frequently, not greater than 52 weeks.4
In 2008, Congress took a series of actions that eventually led to the possibility of UI recipients
receiving a maximum of 99 weeks of benefits. In response to the surge in long-term unemployment,
Congress created a temporary third-tier UI program—the Emergency Unemployment Compensation
program. In a further unprecedented step, it liberalized the permanent Extended Benefits program by
extending access to, and the duration of, benefits. Congress also temporarily transferred Extended
Benefits funding from the Unemployment Trust Fund to general revenue, fully relieving state UI trust
fund accounts of any financial responsibility for the program. Between November 2009 and September
2012, the combination of the three UI programs yielded an unprecedented duration of potential benefits
that reached up to 99 weeks.
Although state UI accounts in the Unemployment Trust Fund are supposed to build up during
nonrecessionary periods (so that they can fund state regular UI benefits during recessions), between
2005 and 2007, state UI tax collections barely exceeded the regular UI benefit payments; thus, fund
balances were not building up for the next recession. As the increase in the number of worker layoffs
accelerated during the first few months of the recession, regular UI benefits surged, reaching $75
billion in fiscal year 2009, while state UI tax collections responded slowly. In fiscal year 2011, regular
UI benefit payments were two-and-a-half times the amount of state collections. As a result, by the end
of fiscal year 2011, states had borrowed massively from the federal loan account in the Unemployment
Trust Fund, with the outstanding state loan balance reaching $38.2 billion.
ARRA included a variety of UI provisions that were designed to ease the problems of both the
unemployed and the financially strapped state UI programs. ARRA provisions not only extended the
temporary Emergency Unemployment Compensation program through December 26, 2009, but also
funded a temporary increase of $25 in weekly UI benefits. The increase, called Federal Additional
Compensation, was made available to all unemployed workers participating in all UI programs and
came at a cost of $20.1 billion for the period 2009–2011. The permanent Extended Benefits program
became 100 percent federally funded, and states could temporarily ease program eligibility
requirements to expand the number of unemployed workers eligible for the benefits. These Extended
Benefits provisions cost the federal government $24.0 billion between 2009 and 2011. The taxation of
UI benefits also was partially suspended. State UI agencies were given relief from the repayment and
accrual of interest on their outstanding federal loans. Further, state UI agencies received $500 million in
additional UI administrative funds to respond to increased workloads. Finally, to increase program
eligibility, UI Modernization provisions were enacted as part of ARRA.5

Employment Service
State UI programs refer their claimants to the Employment Service for job referral and reemployment
services. Since 1993, the UI program also refers targeted claimants to local workforce offices for
reemployment services under the Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services system. At the local
offices, UI claimants can receive referrals to jobs, assessments, counseling, labor market information,
job search workshops, and referrals to training. During the recession, the local offices contributed to a
large increase in reemployment services, an increase funded by a $250 million appropriation in the
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form of Reemployment Services Grants, part of ARRA. These grants were appropriated to the
Employment Service to serve UI claimants. Despite the additional funding, the local workforce offices
quickly experienced resource constraints, as the number of workers seeking services expanded rapidly.
As a result, low-cost services—orientations and assessments—saw the largest enrollments, while the
more expensive and intensive services of counseling, and education and training, experienced smaller
increases.6 (See figure 1.)

Page 6

Monthly Labor Review

U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS

The Employment Service serves all workers, whether they enter the doors of the local workforce offices
or seek services online. Because the number of workers served fluctuates over the business cycle,
during 2008, the Employment Service experienced a sharp increase in the number of participants
seeking its services, with no initial increase in resources. Only in February 2009, with the passage of
ARRA, did the Employment Service receive additional funding of $150 million for basic grants to
states and $250 million for reemployment services for UI claimants. Between program year 2006 and
program year 2009, the number of active job seekers participating in Wagner–Peyser Act programs
increased nationally by over 50 percent—from 14.7 million to 22.4 million. (See table 3.) Similarly, the
number of participants receiving staff-assisted services increased by half during this period, while the
number of eligible UI claimants served more than doubled. Clearly, the percent increase in individuals
being served and the percent increase in services provided were much greater than the percent increase
in Employment Service funding from ARRA.
Table 3. Number of active job seekers participating in Wagner–Peyser Act programs, program years 2006–
2010 (in millions)
Category

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

14.7

17.8

19.6

22.4

21.8

9.4

9.7

11.9

14.2

13.4

Career guidance

1.9

1.8

2.8

3.3

3.4

Job search activities

4.4

4.8

5.8

7.7

6.2

Referred to employment

4.7

4.7

4.8

5.8

5.2

60.0

64.0

59.0

48.0

48.0

4.5

5.6

8.3

10.7

10.0

Total participants
Received staff-assisted services

Entered employment rate (percent)
Eligible UI claimants
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, ETA 9002 reports.

Although between 55 percent and 65 percent of Employment Service participants received staffassisted services, the workforce system was under strain; participants frequently were directed to
computer rooms in the workforce offices, searching for work mostly on their own.7 While many
participants received some job search assistance or were referred to jobs, the percentage of workers
who found jobs after being served declined from 64 percent in 2007 to 48 percent in 2009.
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Most of the increase in the number of participants was due to UI claimants who had permanently lost
their jobs; these claimants represented 6.2 million of the 7.7 million participants added between 2006
and 2009. As shown in figure 2, the increase in the quarterly number of Employment Service
participants accelerated near the end of 2007 and continued to climb until it crested in the third quarter
of 2010, at nearly 5 million individuals. The number of participants receiving staff-assisted services
followed closely, but at a slower pace. It leveled off at 3.1 million a few quarters before the peak and
slowly declined throughout the remainder of the recession and the ARRA funding period.
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The Employment Service initially faced the increased flow of program participants with the same
budget and staffing as it had before the recession. The Employment Service budget had been fairly
constant in nominal terms for a long period, ranging between $700 million and $800 million per year
since 1996. Supplemental funding became available in early 2009.8 Figure 3 shows that while basic
funding for the Employment Service programs was relatively flat throughout the recessionary period,
the ARRA funding substantially accommodated the increase in participants during 2009 and early
2010, even though funding per participant did not return to prerecession levels.

Workforce Investment Act
In addition to providing basic reemployment services similar to the Employment Service programs, the
two WIA adult programs—the WIA Dislocated Worker program and the WIA Adult program—provide
more intensive services to unemployed adults than those typically provided through the Employment
Service. The WIA Dislocated Worker program, in particular, played a major role during the ARRA
period in providing permanently unemployed workers with intensive services and training.
WIA Adult program. While the number of participants in the WIA Adult program increased during
the recession, that number had been going up for more than a year before the recession began and long
before the enactment of ARRA. Figure 4 shows the increase, starting in 2006, in the number of
entrants, participants, and program completers (“exiters”).9 The primary reason for the increase was the
2006 issuance of reporting instructions by DOL that permitted states to co-enroll Employment Service
participants (and other program participants) in WIA programs. Several states (including New York)
began co-enrolling all Employment Service participants, swelling the number of WIA participants not
only within those states but nationally as well.
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The nature of the WIA Adult program changed with the onset of the recession. Longer unemployment
durations translated into longer participation in the WIA Adult program. Thus, between the third
quarter of 2008 and the third quarter of 2009, the gap between the number of entrants and exiters
widened, leading to a surge in the number of active participants. During that period, the number of
exiters continued to climb, but not as fast as the number of new program entrants. Shortly after the third
quarter of 2009, however, the number of entrants and exiters leveled off and remained flat at about
300,000 new entrants and exiters per quarter thereafter, except for a one-quarter spike of entrants in the
third quarter of 2010.10
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The uptick in the number and percentage of WIA Adult participants receiving intensive services was
paralleled by an increase in the average number of reemployment services. As shown in Figure 5, that
average number climbed from 2.2 services in the first quarter of 2008 to 2.9 services in the third quarter
of 2009, indicating that participants were not only participating in reemployment services that required
more staff time but also receiving a greater number of services. Another indication of the greater
number and intensity of services was the increase in the number of days in the program. This increase
in receipt of services occurred about four quarters after the number of services started to rise. However,
the increase in average duration in the program also could be attributed to the difficulty in finding
employment, as the number of days continued to climb even after the number of services received
began to decline.11
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As the recession continued to deepen in 2008, the increase in the number of WIA Adult participants
accelerated. (See figure 6.) In 2009, the ARRA supplemental funding helped accommodate the increase
in participation, although the additional funds did not keep pace with the influx of participants.
WIA Dislocated Worker program.
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The WIA Dislocated Worker program provides services to experienced workers who have permanently
lost their jobs through no fault of their own. The program is highly responsive to increases in
unemployment. Consequently, as the unemployment rolls swelled during 2008, the number of entrants
into the WIA Dislocated Worker program also increased. Figure 7 shows the flow of new entrants into
the program. From 2005 to the middle of 2008, the number of new entrants averaged approximately
61,000 per quarter. As the recession set in, the number of new entrants increased sharply. Between the
second quarter of 2008 and the second quarter of 2009, the number of unemployed increased by 6
million, swelling the ranks of the unemployed to more than 14 million, an increase of 74 percent.
During that 1-year period, the number of entrants into the WIA Dislocated Worker program increased
by 110,000 per quarter, a much larger, 173-percent, increase.
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As durations of unemployment increased, more participants in the WIA Dislocated Worker program
remained in it for longer periods and the rate of exiting the program declined. Starting in the second
quarter of 2009, the average period of participation in the program began to increase. (See figure 8.)
This occurred at the same time as ARRA funding became available, but the upward trend continued
throughout the entire funding period, long after the number and percentage of exiters receiving training
declined. Moreover, the average number of services received by program participants trended
downward during most of this period. Although the increased usage of more intensive services may
have contributed to the increased duration in program participation (at least in the early part of the
ARRA funding period), this cannot explain the continued increase in the length of participant stay in
the program, because the percentage of participants receiving intensive services and training fell after
the third quarter of 2009.
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Because training was seen as prudent during a long unemployment spell, when many workers did
not have the option to return to work, federal guidance to state workforce agencies regarding ARRA
funding stressed that training should be emphasized. In response, state workforce agencies enrolled a
large number of workers in training during the 2 years of WIA supplemental funding availability.
Enrollment in training for the two WIA programs increased by 56 percent from 2008 to 2009 and
increased further in 2010, although enrollment during the 3-year period was limited to a small portion
of workers completing participation in the WIA programs. (See table 4.)
Table 4. WIA Adult and WIA Dislocated Worker program exiters, program years 2005–2010
Year

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

Adult

243,030

Core services
only
60,524

Dislocated
Worker

229,832

60,652

Total

474,862

WIA program

All exiters

Core and intensive
Training
services only
74,671 107,834
90,141

Training/
Exiters
–

79,038

–

121,176

164,812 186,872

.40

Adult

616,973

413,388

94,314 104,271

–

Dislocated
Worker

267,152

125,161

67,853

74,138

–

Total

884,125

543,549

162,167 178,409

.20

Adult

831,322

595,251

124,507 111,564

–

Dislocated
Worker

239,022

114,425

Total 1,070,344
Adult 1,026,729

61,642

–

709,676

187,462 173,206

.16

657,268

260,139 109,322

–

358,233

195,649

106,412

56,172

–

Total 1,384,962

852,917

366,551 165,494

.12

Adult 1,186,621

687,833

346,503 152,285

–

581,967

273,039

203,383 105,555

–

Total 1,768,588

960,862

549,886 257,840

.15

Adult 1,243,907

763,787

327,307 152,813

–

719,846

370,577

221,712 127,557

–

Total 1,963,753

1,134,364

549,019 280,370

.14

Dislocated
Worker

Dislocated
Worker

Dislocated
Worker

62,955

Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Workforce Investment Act Standardized Report Data reporting information, various years.
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WIA Dislocated Worker basic appropriations and expenditures, measured in nominal terms, remained
fairly constant before, during, and after the recession. The number of program participants, however,
began to increase sharply in 2008, with the onset of the recession. Although state workforce agencies
had to provide services for additional participants without additional funding throughout 2008, ARRA
funds became available in 2009 and increased the capacity to provide reemployment services and
training to the greatly increased number of participants. (See figure 9.)
THE RECENTLY COMPILED PUBLIC WORKFORCE SYSTEM DATASET permits, for the first
time, an analytical assessment of the response of the public workforce system to the 2007–2009
recession. Analysis based on that dataset indicates that the UI, Employment Service, and WIA
programs responded quickly to the severe economic downturn. The programs provided assistance to
workers as soon as the recession hit, even before supplemental funding was made available through
ARRA. As an entitlement program, the UI program started to serve the influx of eligible unemployed as
soon as they filed a claim. In June 2008, Congress extended benefits beyond the regular 26 weeks
through the permanent Extended Benefits program and the Emergency Unemployment Compensation
program. The Employment Service and WIA programs similarly began to serve unemployed workers at
the onset of the recession, but their capacity to do so before the ARRA enactment was strained by the
lack of additional funding.
ARRA provided supplemental funding for public workforce programs, including UI, allowing them
to serve many more participants and enabling states to pay benefits for longer durations. The increased
funding also expanded training and job assistance for WIA and Employment Service participants.
However, because the increase in participation exceeded the increase in funding, expenditures per
participant were lower than they were before the recession.

Page 16

Monthly Labor Review

U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS

Notes

1 An early version of this dataset is available to the public at http://www.data.gov/.
2 The figures in this article were originally developed by Randall W. Eberts and Stephen A. Wandner for their chapter
“Data analysis of the implementation of the Recovery Act: workforce development and unemployment insurance
provisions,” in Burt S. Barnow and Richard A. Hobbie, eds., The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act: the role of
workforce programs (Kalamazoo, MI: W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 2013), pp. 267–307, http://
research.upjohn.org/up_press/223/.
3 Although a permanent Extended Benefits program was enacted in 1970, in recent years, few states qualify under its
stringent eligibility criteria. Congress enacts temporary extensions of UI benefits only during periods of high
unemployment.
4 Julie M. Whittaker and Katelin P. Isaacs, Extended unemployment compensation benefits during recessions, CRS
report for Congress RL34340 (Congressional Research Service, May 2013), www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34340.pdf.
5 Alison M. Shelton, Kathleen Romig, and Julie M. Whittaker, Unemployment insurance provisions in the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, CRS report for Congress R40368 (Congressional Research Service, March
2009), http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40368_20090304.pdf.
6 Eberts and Wandner, “Data analysis of the implementation of the Recovery Act.”
7 Ibid. See also Stephen A. Wandner, “The public workforce system’s response to declining funding after the Great
Recession,” Unemployment and Recovery Project working paper 5 (The Urban Institute, May 2013), http://
www.urban.org/publications/412866.html.
8 Stephen A. Wandner, “The response of the U.S. public workforce system to high unemployment during the Great
Recession,” Unemployment and Recovery Project working paper 4 (The Urban Institute, September 2012), http://
www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412679-The-Response-of-the-US-Public-Workforce-System-to-High-Unemployment.pdf.
9 The number of entrants and exiters is a measure of the flow of individuals into and out of the program, whereas the
number of participants is a measure of the stock of individuals in the program.
10 According to Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey data compiled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the
average monthly number of hires during the second half of 2009 was 1.6 million below the average monthly number of
hires from the third quarter of 2005 through the fourth quarter of 2007, a 30-percent reduction.
11 As with the other trends in services, the average duration in the program and the number of services received
appear to be influenced by the advent of co-enrollment in 2006. Immediately before that time, the average number of
services was around 3.5 and the average duration in the program was around 300 days. By the fourth quarter of 2006,
these numbers had fallen to 2.2 services and 119 days, respectively.
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